Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Annual Georgia Student Philosophy Symposium - April 10, 2010

Keynote speaker: Professor David Schmidtz Department of Philosophy,
University of Arizona

Undergraduate and graduate students in all disciplines encouraged to
submit their work on any philosophical topic.

Scope: Original papers on any philosophical topic from graduate and
undergraduate students are welcome. The conference format will be
symposium-style: each session will include presentation/reading,
commentary, and brief Q&A/discussion period. Undergraduate and
graduate
authors will be selected for presentation. All accepted submissions
will available online in the Proceedings of the Georgia Student
Philosophy Symposium.

Prizes: One prize valued at $100 will be awarded to the most
outstanding paper by a graduate student. Another prize valued at $100
will be awarded to the most outstanding paper by an undergraduate
student. Prizes may take the form of books of the winner's choice.
Winners will be selected on the basis of philosophical content/
insight, clarity of written expression, and general appeal to a
student audience.


Submission Requirements: Papers must be prepared for blind review
(i.e., no author-identifying information or notes in the body of the
paper, only on the cover page). Reading length of paper should not
exceed twenty-five minutes (approx 3750 words). When submitting,
please include the following in the body of the email:

1. Author's name
2. Paper/presentation title
3. Brief abstract (~100 words describing topic discussed in paper)
4. Academic status (undergraduate/graduate), major, university
affiliation
5. Regularly checked email address

Submissions that fail to include all of the above will not be
accepted. No more than one submission per author will be considered.
Authors should email their submission as a Word or PDF attachment to
Shane Callahan at scallahan2@student.gsu.edu

Deadline: Papers must be received no later than January 20, 2010.
Notification of acceptance will be emailed by February 21, 2010.

For any questions (including queries from students traveling from
outside the area who may need overnight accommodations) - contact
Shane Callahan at scallahan2@student.gsu.edu

Sponsored by the Zeta Chapter (Georgia) of Phi Sigma Tau, and the
Center for Ethics, Student Forum Georgia State University


Posted by Andrew I. Cohen, Department of Philosophy, Georgia State
University - aicohen@gsu.edu

Monday, December 7, 2009

Books for Philosophy of Religion, Spring 2010; links to used copies on Amazon.com:

1. A Thinker's Guide to the Philosophy of Religion (Paperback) by Allen Stairs and Christopher Bernard Longman; 1 edition (October 7, 2006); please find used if possible.


2. Why Lord? Suffering and Evil in Black Theology, by Anthony Pinn (Continuum, 1999).

3. A Rulebook for Arguments, by Anthony Weston, Hackett Publishing; any edition; please find used if possible)

Tuesday, December 1, 2009

The Third Annual Southeast Philosophy Congress invites submissions from undergraduate and graduate students in any area of philosophy. The Congress, hosted by Clayton State University in Morrow, Georgia, runs February 12-13, 2010, with keynote speaker George Rainbolt from Georgia State University. Presented papers will be published in online and print proceedings.

Talks run 20 minutes, followed by a 10 minute question/answer period. Please email papers, accompanied by a brief abstract, to Dr. Todd Janke: ToddJanke@Clayton.edu. Submission deadline is January 31, 2010. To allow time to plan travel, speakers will be notified immediately upon acceptance and selection will close when all slots are filled. The registration fee of $45.00 includes lunch both days and a print copy of the proceedings.

Final Examination Schedule
FALL 2009
Last Day of Classes: Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Reading Period: Thursday, Thursday, December 3rd and Friday, December 4th 2009
Final Examination Week: Monday, December 7th through Friday, December 11th
Classes That Meet Days Examination Date Examination Time

10:00 AM MWF Tuesday, December 8th 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

For Wedneday, the following reading are assigned and/or re-assigned:

Gregory Pence, Ch. 4. “UTILITARIANS VS. KANTIANS ON STOPPING AIDS,” from The Elements of Bioethics (McGraw Hill, 2006)http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/pence.pdf

3. “Racism and Health Care: A Medical Ethics Issue,” AnnetteDula, from A Companion to African-American Philosophy (Blackwell, 2003).http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/dula.pdf


You might want to take a look at this as well:
“The Singer Solution to World Poverty,” Peter Singer, The NY Times.http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/19990905.htm

For Monday, we will move on to Pence Ch. 5.

Monday, November 23, 2009

FOR MONDAY: PRINT OUT AND READ: Gregory Pence, Ch. 4. “UTILITARIANS VS. KANTIANS ON STOPPING AIDS,” from The Elements of Bioethics (McGraw Hill, 2006)http://aphilosopher.googlepages.com/pence.pdf

Oh, BTW, the due date on the Regan paper (see blog and previous emails for the assignement) has been changed to the Monday after we get back from Thanksgiving so that we can have more time to do more of the Pence book.

Wednesday, November 18, 2009

Oh, BTW, the due date on the Regan paper (see blog and previous emails for the assignement) has been changed to the Monday after we get back from Thanksgiving so that we can have more time to do more of the Pence book.

On Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 2:57 PM, Nathan Nobis wrote:
I only made copies for people in class today and said they need it. I cannot help students who don't come to class and don't tell me their needs! :)

Monday, November 9, 2009

Paper 2 assignment

Explain Regan's moral theory that he calls the "rights theory." This is a theory that ascribes moral rights to (some) humans and (some) animals. Explain what this theory is, what rights are, and so forth, in a manner that someone who has not read the book would understand.

Explain what practical consequences follow from Regan's rights theory, i.e., what should we do, if it is true?

Explain Regan's argument in favor of the rights theory. How does he support his theory? How does he argue that we should accept it?

Present three of what you think are the strongest and/or most important and/or interesting objections to Regan's rights theory and/or the arguments he gives in its favor. These objections can be from the Regan book, the Preface to the Case for Animal Rights book or the Cohen article. Objections from any other source must be approved by Dr. Nobis.

Bring 3 copies of your paper on Friday, November 20. We will plan to read three students' papers in class for feedback.

Final version due Monday, November 23.

Friday, November 6, 2009

For Monday, the xerox of the preface to the Regan Case for Animal Rights book that I handed out in class. Many objections are considered there.

I mentioned this paper today, FYI:
For Wednesday, we will move on to the Pence Elements of Bioethics book, Chapter 1. If you don't have it and can't get it let me know and I will copy the chapter.

Wednesday, November 4, 2009

For Friday, re-read the section on "Philosophical Objections" in the objections and reply chapter. Also read these pages by Carl Cohen, who is discussed in those pages:

Carl Cohen, “Why Animals Do Not Have Rights,” from Cohen and Regan, The Animal Rights Debate (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001) at http://ethicsandanimals.googlepages.com/cohen-ar-debate.pdf

Video: Carl Cohen, "Why Animals Do Not Have Rights”: http://www.rzuser.uni-heidelberg.de/~rebert/arlectures/media/index.php?f=2&v=cohen Also here: http://youtube.com/profile_videos?user=rainerebert&p=r (GET EXACT LINK)

For Monday, please read that Preface of The Case for Animal Rights that I handed out today.

Friday, October 30, 2009

Monday, Regan Ch. 7 & 8, 'Animal Rights" and "Objections and Replies."

For those of you who missed today, you must write a detailed summary of Regan Ch. 6. You missed important discussion today.

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

Friday: Ch. 6. Human Rights
Monday: Ch. 7 & 8: Animal Rights and Objections and Replies
Wednesday: Moral Philosophy and Change
What are moral rights? The basics of a rights-like view[1]:

I. The basic concepts:
If an individual has (basic) moral rights, then:
(1) Others are not morally free to harm that being by taking his or her most important goods (e.g., his or her life, bodily integrity, liberty, etc.). [contractarianisms deny this]
(2) Benefits that others might derive from harming that individual do not, cannot, justify harming that individual. [utilitarians deny this]

(1) and (2) we can see as a consequence of respect: to treat an individually respectfully requires that (1) you not harm that being by taking its most important goods and (2) you do not harm that being to try to achieve benefits for others.

Saying that the concept is instantiated, or that some beings have the property of having moral rights:
To say “humans[2] have (basic) moral rights” is to say that
(1) “humans should not be harmed by taking away their lives, violating their bodies, restricting their liberty, etc. and
(2) that benefits that others might gain from doing so would not justify those kinds of harms.”
Respecting human beings requires this treatment.

Basic ways to deny this:
(1) Denying (1): No, others are morally free to harm individuals: harming individuals in these ways is not wrong.
· Two options, among many: egoism: “No, morally, I can harm you if doing so will benefit me more than anything else I can do.” Nihilism: “Nothing is right or wrong, good or bad, so harming you in any way is not wrong.”
(2) Denying (2): No, if there are enough overall benefits to be gained by harming individuals, then it’s morally OK to harm them.
· One option, among many: utilitarianism: “Acts are morally permissible when, and only when, they produce the greatest overall utility/intrinsic goodness. If achieving that requires harming you greatly, that’s morally permissible.”

II. So, for those beings that we (1) should not profoundly harm and (2) shouldn’t do this even if there were great benefits from doing so, what is it about those beings that makes this so?

The pattern:

1. Identify some candidate rights-making property (or properties). Get clear on what the property exactly is since, sometimes, the meanings of the terms used are not clear (e.g., human, person, “moral community” etc.”


2. Think about whether this seems true, in light of possible counterexamples (i.e., is this property a sufficient condition for having rights, i.e., _____________ ):

If an individual has this property (or properties), then we (1) should not profoundly harm that individual and (2) we shouldn’t do this even if there were great benefits from doing so.

3. Think about whether this seems true, in light of possible counterexamples (i.e., is this property a necessary condition for having rights, i.e., _____________):

We (1) should not profoundly harm that individual and (2) we shouldn’t do this even if there were great benefits from doing so only if an individual has this property (or properties).

4. Think about whether the property (or properties) seems to be the ones that make harming someone wrong: there must be some [essential] connection between this one and harm.

Patterns of Critical responses:

“No, morally we can profoundly harm this individual (especially if (2) there were great benefits from doing so) because this individual lacks this property (or properties): _________________.


[1] Important details about this account are provided in CASE Ch. 8. For many hard questions about this account, answers are given there.
[2] What’s being referred to when we speak of ‘humans’ and ‘human beings’ is not often clear. Here are some possibilities: (1) anything that’s biologically human, has human DNA, (2) anything of the species homo sapiens, (3) anything biologically human that’s living, (4) anything biologically human that’s living and would pretty easily “naturally” develop into a conscious individual, (5) anything biologically human that’s living and, in some sense, could develop into a conscious individual, (6) anything biologically human that’s living and has a mind (i.e., is conscious, can feel, etc.), etc.

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

The cruelty-kindess view is similar to a virtue ethics theory; for more on those, see:
http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/

For more on utilitarianism, see this entry on Consequentialism:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consequentialism

Monday, October 19, 2009

For Wednesday, we will briefly discuss the "cruelty kindness view" and start discussing utilitarianism.
Writing assignment: what is utilitarianism? (or what are the different kinds of utilitarianism?). What are Regan's arguments against it?
To get to the Philosophers' Index on campus go here:
http://www.auctr.edu/rwwl/Home/databasesincludinggalileob/tabid/109/Default.aspx#ReligionPhilosophy

A SEARCH OF THE PHILOSOPHERS’ INDEX (AVAILABLE ONLINE THROUGH THE LIBRARY) OF “NARVESON OR CONTRACTARIAN” AND “ANIMALS”

· Contractarianism and Interspecies Welfare Conflicts By: Cohen, Andrew. Social Philosophy and Policy, 26(1), 227-257, 31 p. Winter 2009. Abstract: I discuss a contractarian account of the moral status of nonhuman animals. Contractarian norms might constrain any comparison of welfare between humans and animals. Contractarian agreement will likely express some partiality to humans over animals. While the norms emerging from the contract might be silent or inconsistent in some tragic or catastrophic cases, in most ordinary conflicts of welfare, contractors will agree to norms that produce some determinate resolution. What the agreement says can evolve if the contractors or the circumstances change. I close with some remarks on contractarian indeterminacy. (AN PHL2133257)

Database: Philosopher's Index

· 3.

Beastly Contractarianism? A Contractarian Analysis of the Possibility of Animal Rights By: Tucker, Chris, MacDonald, Chris. Essays in Philosophy, 5(2), 1-15, 15 p. June 2004. Abstract: It is largely thought that contractarian affirms the meager moral standing commonly attributed to most animals. In the face of this consensus, animal advocates who feel the need to philosophically ground the moral status of animals have turned to other potential sources. This is not a hard choice for animal advocates to make: utilitarianism is a respectable moral theory that affords animals moral consideration with relative ease. Nevertheless, we argue that this separation is a mistake. Contractarians can offer an account of the moral status of animals that is at least as compelling as that offered by utilitarianism. Grounding the moral worth of animals in contract theory also produces an importantly different account, one that can ground animal rights, as opposed to mere considerability, which some animal advocates will find more appealing than the utilitarian alternative. (edited) (AN PHL1774295)

Database: Philosopher's Index

· 5.

Contractarianism and Animal Rights By: Rowlands, Mark. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14(3), 235-247, 13 p. 1997. Abstract: It is widely accepted, by both friends and foes of animal rights, that contractarianism is the moral theory least likely to justify the assigning of direct moral status to nonhuman animals. These are not, it is generally supposed, rational agents, and contractarian approaches can grant direct moral status only to such agents. I shall argue that this widely accepted view is false. At least some forms of contractarianism, when properly understood, do, in fact, entail that nonhuman animals possess direct moral status, independently of their utility for rational agents, and independently of whatever interests rational agents may have in them. The version of contractarianism I shall focus upon is that defended by John Rawls. (AN PHL1654884)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 6.

Nasty, Brutish, and Short: The Illiberal Intuition that Animals don't Count By: Taylor, Angus. Journal of Value Inquiry, 30(1-2), 265-277, 13 p. June 1996. Abstract: A consistently liberal ethic views as ends-in-themselves all who are subjectively concerned for their own good, and who have the ability in some way to choose what is best for themselves. With this in mind, I argue 1) that contrary to the contractarianism of Jan Narveson, a consistently liberal ethic must recognize many nonhuman animals as members of the moral community, and 2) that all sentient beings have inherent value and thus have moral rights that may be overridden only when satisfaction of our vital needs requires such action. (AN PHL1641992)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 7.

Expanding the Social Contract By: Cavalieri, Paola, Kymlicka, Will. Etica and Animali, 8, 5-33, 29 p. 1996. Abstract: Is the present exclusion of nonhuman animals from the polis warranted? We argue that it is not. Against the background of contractarian doctrine in general, and Rawls's theory in particular, we challenge the presumption that only humans are entitled to equal justice. This presumption rests upon several mistakes, including a muddled use of the notion of "person", arbitrary species bias, and insufficient factual information. We also argue that Rawls's discussion of nonhuman animals fails to live up to his own impartialist commitments. We conclude that justice as impartiality requires expanding the traditional boundaries of the political community, and supports the immediate inclusion of the other great apes. (AN PHL1638478)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 8.

Commentary on 'Contractarianism Gone Wild: Carruthers and the Moral Status of Animals' By: Robinson, William S. Between the Species: A Journal of Ethics, 10(1-2), 49-52, 4 p. Winter-Spring 1994. Abstract: Peter Carruthers has claimed that his version of contractarianism can support certain distinctions that his theory of ethics regarding animals requires. Boonin-Vail's paper disputes this, holding that the required distinctions cannot be maintained in a principled way within Carruthers's contractarian framework. I defend Carruthers's ability to make the needed distinctions. One key point turns on being careful to exclude certain obvious "moral" judgments from behind the veil of ignorance, where they cannot legitimately enter because they depend on "results" of contracting. Another requires careful separation of "intrinsic" (noninstrumental) possession of moral rights from possession of "full" moral rights. (AN PHL1255729)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 9.

Contracts, Animals, and Ecosystems By: Wenz, Peter S. Social Theory and Practice: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal of Social Philosophy, 19(3), 315-344, 30 p. FALL 1993. Abstract: The review essay discusses issues raised in "The Animals Issue" by Peter Carruthers and "The Animal Rights/ Environmental Ethics Debate" edited by Eugene C Hargrove. Carruthers is shown to present poor arguments for contractarian ethics, and for rejection on contractarian ground of animals' direct moral considerability. The Hargrove collection, by contrast, includes interesting and helpful essays that argue against animal rights on holistic environmentalist grounds. The review essay accepts holistic environmentalism but maintains that protection of many individual animals, and vegetarianism, partly out of concern for animal welfare, are morally required of industrial people. (AN PHL1245810)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 10.

Moral Matters By: Narveson, Jan. Peterborough: Broadview Pr. 1993. Abstract: "Moral Matters" is a series of essays on the familiar general moral issues, preceded by an unconventional introduction to moral philosophy in a broadly Hobbesian contractarian framework, which criticizes the usual "consequential/deontological" classification. Topics treated: suicide, euthanasia, criminal punishment, war, animal rights, starvation, population control, abortion, sexual ethics (sex, love, marriage, family), pornography, non-discrimination, affirmative action, and obeying the law. A radically liberal ("libertarian") view is argued for each. It is intended to be used with any anthology in which proponents of other viewpoints speak for themselves. (AN PHL1240476)

· Commentary: On the Utility of Contracts By: Sapontzis, Steve F. Between the Species: A Journal of Ethics, 8(4), 229-232, 4 p. FALL 1992. Abstract: This paper discusses whether participants in Rawls' original position could be incarnated as animals. In response to an argument that they could not be, it is argued that Rawls' criticisms of utilitarianism would not inevitably lead to defining individuality in terms of life-plans--something animals generally lack--and calling for the respecting of such individuality. Finally, it is argued that contractarian analyses of justice must inevitably fail to provide a complete theory of justice. (AN PHL1238744)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 12.

ON A CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS. By: NARVESON, JAN. Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, 70, 31-49, 19 p. January 1987. Abstract: THIS ESSAY DISCUSSES TOM REGAN'S "THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS". ITS CENTRAL ARGUMENT IS IDENTIFIED AND ANALYZED AND FOUND TO BE BOTH INVALID AND TO PROCEED FROM QUESTIONABLE PREMISES. FURTHER, REGAN'S ARGUMENT DEPENDS STRONGLY ON APPEALS TO INTUITION, ESPECIALLY INTUITIONS ABOUT THE RIGHTS OF "MARGINAL HUMANS." BUT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS TO ACCOUNT FOR THEM, AND BESIDES, REGAN'S VIEW THAT ANIMALS HAVE STRONG RIGHTS, REQUIRING US TO BE VEGETARIANS AND TO REFRAIN FROM RESEARCH ON THEM, IS ALSO UNINTUITIVE. A CONTRACTARIAN ACCOUNT IS OFFERED, CONTRA REGAN, WHICH GIVES ANIMALS NO "BASIC" RIGHTS. (AN PHL1149752)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 14.

ANIMAL RIGHTS REVISITED By: NARVESON, JAN. ETHICS AND ANIMALS. CLIFTON: HUMANA PR. 1983. (AN PHL1124243)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 15.

RATIONAL EGOISM AND ANIMAL RIGHTS. By: JAMIESON, DALE. Environmental Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Journal Dedicated to the Philosophical Aspects of Environmental Problems, 3, 167-172, 6 p. Summer 1981. Abstract: JAN NARVESON HAS SUGGESTED THAT "RATIONAL EGOISM" MIGHT PROVIDE A DEFENSIBLE MORAL PERSPECTIVE THAT WOULD PUT ANIMALS OUT OF THE REACH OF MORALITY WITHOUT DENYING THAT THEY ARE CAPABLE OF SUFFERING. I ARGUE THAT RATIONAL EGOISM PROVIDES A PRINCIPLED INDIFFERENCE TO THE FATE OF ANIMALS AT HIGH COST: THE POSSIBILITY OF PRINCIPLED INDIFFERENCE TO THE FATE OF 'MARGINAL HUMANS'. (AN PHL1110134)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 16.

JUSTICE AND THE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS: A CRITIQUE OF RAWLS. By: PRITCHARD, MICHAEL S, ROBISON, WADE L. Environmental Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Journal Dedicated to the Philosophical Aspects of Environmental Problems, 3, 55-61, 7 p. Spring 1981. Abstract: ALTHOUGH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INITIAL SITUATION OF JUSTICE IN JOHN RAWLS' "THEORY OF JUSTICE" CHOOSE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE ONLY, THEIR CHOICES HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER MORAL CONCERNS. THE ONLY CHECK ON THE SELF-INTEREST OF THE PARTICIPANTS IS THAT THERE BE UNANIMOUS ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLES. BUT, SINCE ANIMALS ARE NOT PARTICIPANTS, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT PRINCIPLES WILL BE ADOPTED WHICH CONFLICT WITH WHAT RAWLS CALLS "DUTIES OF COMPASSION AND HUMANITY" TOWARD ANIMALS. THIS IS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE INITIAL SITUATION'S ASSUMPTION THAT PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE CAN BE DETERMINED INDEPENDENTLY OF OTHER MORAL CONSIDERATIONS. WE QUESTION THIS ASSUMPTION, AND SHOW THAT SATISFACTORY MODIFICATIONS OF RAWLS' INITIAL SITUATION UNDERMINE ITS CONTRACTARIAN BASIS AND REQUIRE THE REJECTION OF EXCLUSIVELY SELF-INTERESTED PARTICIPANTS. (AN PHL1108753)

Database: Philosopher's Index

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· 17.

ANIMAL RIGHTS (IN POLISH). By: NARVESON, JAN. Etyka, 18, 147-168, 22 p. 1980. Abstract: (NOTE: THE ARTICLE IS A POLISH TRANSLATION OF MY "ANIMAL RIGHTS REVISITED", PUBLISHED IN "ANIMAL REGULATION STUDIES" 2, PP. 223-236 (1980)). WHAT THE AUTHOR REGARDS AS THE THREE MAJOR ETHICAL/POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES OF CURRENT INTEREST ARE EXPLORED: LIBERTARIANISM, UTILITARIANISM, AND CONTRACTARIANISM. NONE IS FOUND TO GIVE MUCH SUPPORT FOR STRONG ANIMAL RIGHTS. THE MOST INTERESTING, IT IS SUGGESTED, IS CONTRACTARIANISM, WHICH GIVES NO SUPPORT FOR THEM AT ALL ON THE BASIC LEVEL. ANIMALS NEITHER POSE THE KIND OF THREAT THAT WOULD MAKE A CONTRACT RATIONAL, NOR ARE THEY CAPABLE OF MAKING AND KEEPING AGREEMENTS WERE THAT DESIRABLE. (AN PHL1111304)

Database: Philosopher's Index

· 19.

ANIMAL RIGHTS. By: NARVESON, JAN. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 161-178, 18 p. March 1977. Abstract: THE VIEWS OF PETER SINGER, AND VARIOUS AUTHORS IN THE SINGER/REGAN ANTHOLOGY "ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS", ARE EXPLORED. THEIR CASE AGAINST "SPECIESISM," THAT ONLY MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN SPECIES ARE ELIGIBLE FOR MORAL CONSIDERATIONS, IS ACCEPTED, BUT THE FURTHER INFERENCE THAT ANIMALS HAVE STRONG RIGHTS, ESPECIALLY NOT TO BE KILLED FOR FOOD, IS QUESTIONED. UTILITARIANISM WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO LEAVE ROOM FOR THE EATING OF ANIMALS, THOUGH RATHER PRECARIOUSLY. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL VIEW OF MORALITY WHICH IS ARGUED TO MAKE BEST SENSE OF OUR INCLINATION TO THINK THAT EATING ANIMALS IS PERMISSIBLE IS A CONTRACTARIAN/EGOIST ONE. THIS MAKES IT OBVIOUS THAT WE HAVE NO OBLIGATIONS TO ANIMALS, SINCE WE NEED INCUR NONE (AND CAN'T ANYWAY, OWING TO LACK OF COMMUNICATION); AT THE SAME TIME IT MAKES SENSE OF OUR DUTIES TO WEAKER HUMANS. BUT THE WHOLE ISSUE IS AGREED TO BE A DIFFICULT ONE. (AN PHL1055345)

· 20.

NARVESON ON EGOISM AND THE RIGHTS OF ANIMALS. By: REGAN, TOM. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7, 179-186, 8 p. March 1977. Abstract: I CHALLENGE NARVESON'S ATTEMPTS (1) TO INCLUDE INFANT AND SEVERELY MENTALLY-ENFEEBLED HUMANS WITHIN THE CLASS OF BEINGS PROTECTED BY MORAL RULES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NO RIGHTS AND (2) TO EXCLUDE ALL NON-HUMAN ANIMALS BOTH FROM THE CLASS OF BEINGS PROTECTED BY MORAL RULES AND FROM THE CLASS OF BEINGS HAVING RIGHTS. (AN PHL1054933)