Saturday, July 19, 2008

Tuesday, May 6, 2008

Follow up from Final Meeting

Here's a few things as a follow up to our final meeting today.

1. Here's Jeff Macmahon's page: http://philosophy.rutgers.edu/FACSTAFF/BIOS/mcmahan.html

He's a rather famous guy these days; he has developed arguments for a view something along the lines of what was suggested by Emerson, namely that beings that are more closely psychologically connected to their futures are more "valuable" than beings that are not connected to the future. He has tons of papers online.

2. Maybe metaphysical issues regarding personal identity have a connection to the morality of abortion. Maybe. See here for more: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/

3. Here's some of the research on Marquis's argument about abortion, from the Philosophers Index:

Search #5 : ( marquis )and( abortion )

1 TI: Two Puzzles for Marquis's Conservative View on Abortion


AU: Card,-Robert


SO: Bioethics-. S 2006; 20(5): 264-277


IS: 0269-9702


AB: Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis's argument for the modified conservative view. I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis's view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position. (edited)


DE: ABORTION-; CONSERVATIVE-; ETHICS-; KILLING-; MORALITY-


PS: MARQUIS,-DON


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2094252




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

2 TI: Savulescu's Objections to the Future of Value Argument


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Journal-of-Medical-Ethics. F 2005; 31(2): 119-122


IS: 0306-6800


AB: This essay is a response to Julian Savulescu's objections to the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion published in the Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2002. Firstly, Savulescu's claim that the future of value argument has implausible implications is considered. The author argues that the argument does not have these implications. Secondly, properties which, according to Savulescu, could underwrite the wrongness of killing and that are acquired only after implantation, are considered. It is argued that none of these properties is an adequate basis for the distinction between wrongful and permissible killing.


DE: ABORTION-; ARGUMENT-; ETHICS-; VALUE-


PS: SAVULESCU,-JULIAN


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2078305




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

3 TI: Does a Normal Foetus Really Have a Future of Value? A Reply to Marquis


AU: Lovering,-Robert-P


SO: Bioethics-. Ap 2005; 19(2): 131-145


IS: 0269-9702


AB: In this paper, I argue that Marquis's strategy is not different since it involves the concept of person--a concept deeply rooted in the traditional approach. Specifically, I argue that futures are valuable insofar as they are not only dominated by goods of consciousness, but are experienced by psychologically continuous persons. Moreover, I argue that his strategy is not sound since premise (1) is false. Specifically, I argue that a normal foetus, at least during the first trimester, is not a person. Thus, during that stage of development it is not capable of experiencing its future as a psychologically continuous person and, hence, it does not have a future of value. (edited)


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; PERSON-


PS: MARQUIS,-DON


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2073227




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

4 TI: Uma Defesa do Argumento de Marquis contra o Aborto


AU: Galvao,-Pedro


SO: Philosophica-. Ap 05; 25: 169-185


IS: 0872-4784


AB: The main aim of this essay is to defend Don Marquis's "future-like-ours" argument against abortion from David Boonin's recent critique to it. In the first two sections I show that Marquis's FLO argument is much more plausible than the traditional argument against abortion, grounded on an appeal to the humanity of the fetus. The third section explains Boonin's critique to the FLO argument. In the last section I show that: (1) Boonin's critique rests on a misunderstanding concerning the content of Marquis's moral principle; (2) We can restate Boonin's position in order to avoid that misunderstanding, but such restatement leads to the (unacceptable) conclusion that infanticide, and not only abortion, is morally permissible.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; FUTURE-; INFANTICIDE-


PS: BOONIN,-DAVID; MARQUIS,-DON


LA: Portuguese


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2072449




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

5 TI: Savulescu's Objections to the Future of Value Argument


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Journal-of-Medical-Ethics. F 05; 31(1): 119-122


IS: 0306-6800


AB: Julian Savulescu has objected to the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion on the grounds that the argument has implausible implications for contraception and cloning and because humans acquire the right to life only when they acquire the capacity for some kind of mental activity. I respond to both families of objections.


DE: ABORTION-; CLONING-; CONTRACEPTION-; RIGHT-TO-LIFE; VALUE-


PS: SAVULESCU,-JULIAN


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2070722




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

6 TI: Brill's Objections to the Future of Value Argument


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Social-Theory-and-Practice. Ja 05; 31(1): 105-114


IS: 0037-802X


AB: H. Skott Brill has argued (Social Theory and Practice 29(3) (July 2003) 419-430) that because of considerations having to do with personal identity and because zygotes can split to form identical twins, the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion is unsound. I offer responses to his objections.


DE: ABORTION-; ARGUMENT-; ETHICS-; VALUE-


PS: BRILL,-H-SKOTT; MCINERNEY,-PETER


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2070673




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

7 TI: Moral Disagreement and Abortion


AU: Gert,-Bernard


SO: Australian-Journal-of-Professional-and-Applied-Ethics. Je 04; 6(1): 1-19


IS: 1328-4576


AB: Equally informed, impartial, rational people sometimes disagree with each other on moral matters. These moral disagreements are unresolvable. Whether abortion is morally acceptable is an example of such an unresolvable moral disagreement. The primary source of that disagreement is a difference about who is a member of the group impartially protected by morality. I examine the claims of Don Marquis and Mary Anne Warren to have provided arguments that conclusively support either the view that abortion is prima facie morally wrong or the view that it is morally wrong to legally prohibit abortion, and show that they are mistaken.


DE: ABORTION-; CONSTRUCTIVISM-; DISAGREEMENT-; ETHICS-; MORAL-REALISM


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2070540




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

8 TI: The Deprivation Argument against Abortion


AU: Stretton,-Dean


SO: Bioethics-. Ap 04; 18(2): 144-180


IS: 0269-9702


AB: The most plausible prolife argument claims that abortion is seriously wrong because it deprives the foetus of something valuable. This paper examines two recent versions of this argument. Don Marquis's version takes the valuable thing to be a 'future like ours', a future containing valuable experiences and activities. Jim Stone's version takes the valuable thing to be a future containing conscious goods, which it is the foetus's biological nature to make itself have. I give three grounds for rejecting these arguments. (edited)


DE: ABORTION-; BIOLOGY-; DEPRIVATION-; ETHICS-; FUTURE-; NATURE-


PS: MARQUIS,-D; STONE,-J


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1781045




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

9 TI: Reply to Marquis's "Korcz's Objections to the Future-of-Value Argument"


AU: Korcz,-Keith-Allen


SO: Journal-of-Social-Philosophy. Spr 04; 35(1): 61-65


IS: 0047-2786


AB: I defend my cloning objection to Marquis's future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion, and then respond to Marquis's criticisms of my own argument regarding the morality of abortion. I argue that Marquis's appeal to concepts of a "natural history of skin cells" and an "entrenched notion" of completed cloning to defend his FLO argument are both obscure and unpromising. I also argue that Marquis's suggestion that the FLO principle be limited in application to persons makes appeal to the FLO principle largely otiose.


DE: ABORTION-; DEATH-; ETHICS-; FUTURE-; VALUE-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1780350




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

10 TI: Korcz's Objections to the Future-of-Value Argument


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Journal-of-Social-Philosophy. Spr 04; 35(1): 56-65


IS: 0047-2786


AB: In the Winter 2002 issue of the Journal of Social Philosophy Keith Allan Korcz argued that the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion should be rejected because it implies that avoidance of being cloned and successful contraception are serious evils. He also argued that it should be rejected because fetuses of a gestational age of less than twenty weeks lack a necessary condition for having a right to life. I argue that both of Korcz's objections are flawed.


DE: ABORTION-; CONTRACEPTION-; ETHICS-; FUTURE-; VALUE-


PS: KORCZ,-K


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1780349




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

11 TI: Pasts, Futures, and the Wrongness of Killing: Marquis on Abortion


AU: Oljar,-Elizabeth-A


SO: Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Jl 2003; 19(2): 39-54


IS: 0897-2346


DE: ABORTION-; DEATH-; ETHICS-; KILLING-; WRONGNESS-


PS: MARQUIS,-DON


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2087448




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

12 TI: The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma


AU: Brill,-H-Skott


SO: Social-Theory-and-Practice. Jl 03; 29(3): 419-430


IS: 0037-802X


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; PERSONAL-IDENTITY


PS: MARQUIS,-D; MCINERNEY,-P


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1772117




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

13 TI: Why I Was Never a Zygote


AU: Lane,-Robert


SO: Southern-Journal-of-Philosophy. Spr 03; 41(1): 63-83


IS: 0038-4283


AB: Marquis has argued that abortion is immoral because it deprives the fetus of a "future like ours." But Marquis's argument fails by incorrectly assuming that a zygote and the late-term fetus with which it is physically continuous are numerically identical. In fact, the identity of a prebirth human (PBH) across gestation is indeterminate, such that it is determinately morally permissible to destroy an early-term PBH and determinately immoral to destroy a late-term PBH. Beginning at some indeterminate point during gestation and ending at some indeterminate point later in gestation, destroying a PBH is neither determinately morally permissible nor determinately immoral.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; MURDER-; WRONG-; ZYGOTE-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1711545




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

14 TI: Two Moral Strategies Regarding Abortion


AU: Korcz,-Keith-Allen


SO: Journal-of-Social-Philosophy. Wint 02; 33(4): 581-605


IS: 0047-2786


AB: This article presents a critique of Marquis' argument against abortion, an interpretation of Thomson's violinist argument regarding abortion and a defense of Thomson's argument against objections presented by Tooley, Fischer, and others. I conclude that Thomson's argument has, potentially, a limited application, but that when conjoined with an argument that the fetus has no right to life prior to the time it has mental states, a satisfying argument that the typical abortion is morally permitted is possible. Empirical arguments that the typical legal abortion does not present serious health risks to the mother are also presented.


DE: ABORTION-; MORALITY-; SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHY; STRATEGY-


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1704645




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

15 TI: Conee and Marquis on Contraception


AU: Jacobs,-Russell


SO: Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Jl 02; 18(2): 101-105


IS: 0897-2346


AB: Earl Conee argues that Don Marquis's principle ("The prima facie wrong-making feature of a killing is the loss to the victim of the value of its future") entails that not only abortion, but also contraception, is immoral. Marquis replies that since no subject is deprived of a valuable future in the case of contraception, there is no victim, and thus no wrong. I argue that MP may entail a non-person-affecting principle ("The prima facie wrong-making feature of the elimination of a valuable human future is that a valuable set of experiences is lost") according to which contraception is morally wrong.


DE: ABORTION-; CONTRACEPTION-; ETHICS-


PS: CONEE,-E; MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1701516




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

16 TI: Does Metaphysics Have Implications for the Morality of Abortion?


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Ja 02; 18(1): 73-78


IS: 0897-2346


AB: Earl Conee has claimed (Mind 108, 1999, 619-646) that my argument that abortion is immoral (The Journal of Philosophy 86, 1989, 183-203) is defective because alternatives to three different features of my account are at least as plausible as the aspects of the account I defend. I argue both that his alternatives are difficult to appraise because they are not clearly described and that, on any natural interpretation, the alternatives Conee presents are not plausible at all.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; METAPHYSICS-; MORALITY-


PS: CONEE,-E


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1698981




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

17 TI: Deprivations, Futures and the Wrongness of Killing


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Journal-of-Medical-Ethics. 2001; 27(6): 363-369


IS: 0306-6800


AB: Mark Brown (Journal of Medical Ethics 2000; 26: 103-107) has claimed that the future of value argument is flawed because it implies that we have welfare rights that we don't actually have and because a morally relevant account of the wrongness of killing should be in terms of present mental representations. I reply to both objections.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FUTURE-; KILLING-; MORALITY-; RIGHTS-; WELFARE-


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 2066220




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

18 TI: Marquis: A Defense of Abortion?


AU: Gelfand,-Scott-D


SO: Bioethics-. Ap 01; 15(2): 135-145


IS: 0269-9702


AB: This is a reply to Don Marquis's "Why Abortion is Immoral." Marquis, who asserts that abortion is morally wrong, bases his argument on the following premise: Killing a being is morally wrong if that being is the sort of being who has a valuable future. I argue that this premise is false. In addition, I conclude that such an alteration requires Marquis to adopt a position much like that taken by Judith J. Thompson in "A Defense of Abortion," a position he initially states is indefensible. (edited)


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; IMMORALITY-


PS: MARQUIS,-D; THOMPSON,-J


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1687980




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

19 TI: You Can't Lose What You Ain't Never Had: A Reply to Marquis on Abortion


AU: Sinnott-Armstrong,-Walter


SO: Philosophical-Studies. O 99; 96(1): 59-72


IS: 0031-8116


AB: In "Why Abortion is Immoral" (Journal of Philosophy 1989), Don Marquis presents the most sophisticated and detailed argument against abortion in the literature. While Marquis's argument can be defended against previous criticisms, I show that it depends on an equivocation between morally neutral and morally loaded senses of "loss" in his claim that abortion is morally wrong because it causes a fetus the loss of a valuable future.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; LOSSES-; RIGHT-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1672041




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

20 TI: Understanding the 'Conservative' View on Abortion


AU: Wendler,-Dave


SO: Bioethics-. Ja 99; 13(1): 32-56


IS: 0269-9702


AB: The philosophical literature would have us believe that the conservative view on abortion is based on the claim that the fetus is a person from the time of conception. Given the widespread acceptance of this analysis, it comes as something of a surprise to learn that it conflicts with a number of major arguments offered in support of the conservative view. I argue, in the present paper, that a careful examination of these inconsistencies establishes that the personhood analysis is mistaken: the conservative view is based on the natural process of fetal development, not the personhood of the fetus.


DE: ABORTION-; CONSERVATISM-; ETHICS-; FETUS-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1665979




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

21 TI: Abortion, Infanticide, and the Changing Grounds of the Wrongness of Killing: Reply to Don Marquis's "Reiman on Abortion"


AU: Reiman,-Jeffrey


SO: Journal-of-Social-Philosophy. Fall 98; 29(2): 168-174


IS: 0047-2786


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; MURDER-; RIGHT-; WRONG-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1660057




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

22 TI: Fred Feldman's Confrontations with the Reaper: A Philosophical Study of the Nature and Value of Death


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Nous-. S 96; 30(3): 401-410


IS: 0029-4624


AB: Fred Feldman's book contains careful, interesting and provocative analyses of the concepts of life, death, and dying. His account of the nature of the misfortune of death is sound. His account of the wrongness of killing is an attempt at an account of the wrongness of all killings that are wrong. Such an overly ambitious analysis is both vague and circular. He attempts to provide a gradualist account of the wrongness of abortion such that early abortions are "not very bad" and late abortions are morally "horrendous." This fails too.


DE: DEATH-; ETHICS-; METAPHYSICS-; MYSTERY-; SUICIDE-; UTILITARIANISM-


PS: FELDMAN,-F


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1642719




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

23 TI: Shirley's "Marquis' Argument Against Abortion"


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Jl 95; 11(2): 263-265


IS: 0897-2346


AB: Ned Shirley maintains that a fetus's future cannot be valuable to it because it cannot value anything. I maintain that someone's future will be (or would be) valuable to it at some time if at some later time it values (or would value) its future. It follows that, ordinarily, a fetus's future will be valuable to it.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; RIGHTS-


PS: SHIRLEY,-N


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1632342




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

24 TI: Marquis' Argument Against Abortion: A Critique


AU: Shirley,-Edward-S


SO: Southwest-Philosophy-Review. Ja 95; 11(1): 79-89


IS: 0897-2346


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; MORALITY-; RIGHTS-; WOMEN-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1255319




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

25 TI: Justifying the Rights of Pregnancy: The Interest View


AU: Marquis,-Don


SO: Criminal-Justice-Ethics. Wint-Spr 94; 13(1): 67-81


IS: 0731-129X


AB: Bonnie Steinbock in "Life Before Birth" claims that her interest view provides a better defense of pregnancy rights than a personhood strategy or Thomson's view. I argue that, contrary to Steinbock, the interest view does not entail that insentient fetuses lack moral standing. Even if it did, Steinbock's actual personhood defense of abortion rights renders the interest view redundant. In addition, the interest view fits poorly with her treatment of maternal-fetal conflicts. Steinbock's theory also leaves one without a plausible account of the wrongness of infanticide.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; PREGNANCY-; RIGHTS-; WOMEN-


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1251374




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

26 TI: Having a Future


AU: Daniels,-Charles


SO: Dialogue-. Autumn 92; 31(4): 661-665


IS: 0012-2173


AB: This article critically dissects the premises of an argument of Don Marquis: A) to deprive someone of the value of his or her future is prima facie wrong, B) the future an adult has is included in the future of the fetus it developed from, C) abortion deprives the fetus of the value of its future, D) therefore, abortion is prima facie wrong.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; MEDICAL-ETHICS


LA: English


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1239373




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

27 TI: Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis.


AU: NORCROSS,-ALASTAIR


SO: Journal-of-Philosophy. My 90; 87(5): 268-277


IS: 0022-362X


AB: This is a reply to Marquis's paper, "Why Abortion Is Immoral." Marquis argues that almost all abortions are seriously immoral, because they share the central wrong-making feature of standard killings. I argue that Marquis fails to distinguish morally between contraception and abortion. I also argue that an attempt to distinguish contraception from abortion by appeal to a parsimonious ontology does not provide a morally relevant distinction. I conclude that Marquis is unable to distinguish morally between contraception and abortion without appealing to morally relevant features other than what he calls the "wrong-making feature of one's being killed."


DE: ABORTION-; CONTRACEPTION-; KILLING-; SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHY


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: ENGLISH


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1186681




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

28 TI: Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-like-ours?.


AU: MCINERNEY,-PETER-K


SO: Journal-of-Philosophy. My 90; 87(5): 264-268


IS: 0022-362X


AB: The article argues that a fetus is not related to a personal future in the same way that a normal adult human is related to his or her personal future. In opposition to Marquis, the article argues that at its time a fetus does not already have a personal future of which it can be deprived. For this reason, killing a fetus is morally very different from killing a normal adult human.


DE: ABORTION-; FETUS-; FUTURE-; SOCIAL-PHILOSOPHY


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: ENGLISH


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1186680




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

29 TI: Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's "Why Abortion is Immoral".


AU: CUDD,-ANN-E


SO: Journal-of-Philosophy. My 90; 87(5): 262-264


IS: 0022-362X


AB: This paper responds to a paper by Don Marquis, "Why Abortion is Immoral," Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (April 1989): 183-202. Marquis argues that abortion is immoral because fetuses have what he calls a "future-like-ours." I point out that even if fetuses have futures-like-ours, this gives them only a prima facie right to life, which may well be overridden by their mothers' rights. I also point out ways in which Marquis overstates the claims of the authorities he cites.


DE: ABORTION-; ETHICS-; FETUS-; MORALITY-


PS: MARQUIS,-D


LA: ENGLISH


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1186679




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.

30 TI: WHY ABORTION IS IMMORAL.


AU: MARQUIS,-DON


SO: Journal-of-Philosophy. AP 89; 86: 183-202


IS: 0022-362X


AB: THIS ESSAY OFFERS AN ACCOUNT OF WHAT MAKES IT WRONG INTENTIONALLY TO END THE LIVES OF ADULT HUMAN BEINGS THAT IS SUPERIOR TO ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS, THAT IS INTUITIVELY PLAUSIBLE, AND THAT DEALS IN A PLAUSIBLE WAY WITH ACTIVE EUTHANASIA, WITH VISITORS FROM OUTER SPACE, WITH HIGHER ANIMALS, AND WITH INFANTS. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS CORRECT AND IF THE ETHICS OF ABORTION HANGS ON THE MORAL STATUS OF THE FETUS, THEN THERE EXISTS A STRONG PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF THE IMMORALITY OF ABORTION.


DE: ABORTION-; ARGUMENT-; ETHICS-; LIFE-; PRINCIPLE-


LA: ENGLISH


DT: Journal-Article


AN: 1163978




Complete Record Find Similar
In Database: The Philosopher's Index 1940-2007/06.